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REMEDIAL ACTIVISM: JUDICIAL BARGAINING WITH
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent decisions from the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas, judges have conditioned the reduction of punitive
damage awards on the defendants' willingness to undertake equitable re-
medial action. In O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc.,' a toxic shock
syndrome (TSS) case,2 the jury assessed a tampon manufacturer
$10,000,000 in punitive damages.3 Although the award was not found to
be "excessive, nor did it shock the Court's conscience," 4 Judge Kelly
offered the following proposition to the defendant. If International
Playtex (Playtex) would agree to take remedial measures, including re-
moving its polyacrylate tampon from the market, the court "would con-
sider a substantial reduction, if not elimination, of the punitive damages
award."5 Playtex complied,6 and the punitive award was reduced to
$1,350,000.
7
In Miller v. Cudahy Co.,8 farmland owners and lessees sought to
recover damages9 and equitable relief1° arising from the American Salt
Company's pollution of a freshwater aquifer beneath their croplands.1
2
1. 609 F. Supp. 817 (D. Kan. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-1861 (10th Cir. June 3,
1985) (argued, Jan. 29, 1986).
2. See infra note 20 for an explanation of toxic shock syndrome.
3. O'Gilvie, 609 F. Supp. at 818.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 818-19. The full remedial program implemented by Playtex included the re-
moval of all polyacrylate fibers from tampons currently in production, the recall of polyacry-
late tampons already on the shelves and the implementation of a public education program
aimed at warning consumers of the dangers of TSS. Id.
7. Id. at 820.
8. 592 F. Supp. 976 (D. Kan. 1984), appeal dismissed, No. 85-1450 (10th Cir. Jan. 31,
1986) (appeal held premature because lower court has not yet rendered final judgment on
punitive damage award).
9. Id. at 1005-06. The court awarded compensatory damages for injury to cropland from
the salt brine pollution, consequential damages for injury to water wells and injury to a dairy
business, damages for trespass and punitive damages. The court, however, concluded that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to consequential damages for stress, aggravation and mental
anguish. Id.
10. Id. at 1007. "The plaintiffs have invoked the equitable jurisdiction of this Court by
praying for injunctive relief.... The continuing trespass by the defendants' pipelines on Cecil
Miller's property must come to an end. The Court will, therefore, enjoin the continuation of
this trespass .... " Id.
11. The court noted:
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Judge Theis held that "the facts and circumstances of this case are such
that the Court should exercise its discretion to find the defendants liable
to the plaintiffs for punitive damages, in the amount of $10,000,000."Il
However, the court decided to hold final judgment on the punitive award
temporarily in abeyance, "pending the defendants' good-faith efforts to
define and remedy the pollution they have caused."14 The court is now
overseeing the defendants' cleanup efforts, reserving the right to award
the punitive damages, in full or in part, should the cleanup effort not
proceed in good faith "or at any time that it becomes apparent that any
cleanup effort is impossible for either scientific or financial reasons."15
To date, O'Gilvie and Miller are the only known examples of judicial
bargaining with punitive damage awards. 6 However, should this prac-
tice become widespread, there may be significant ramifications. The
threat of a large punitive damage award gives courts a strong bargaining
position to encourage defendants to take the remedial alternative sug-
gested. Moreover, judicial bargaining with punitive damages allows
judges to act as regulators without the political checks that attend action
by administrative agencies. Judicial bargaining with punitive damages
demands that the courts become the creators and managers of complex
forms of equitable relief. Depending on the remedial alternative offered
by the judge, the action taken by the defendant may require ongoing judi-
cial supervision of its administration and implementation and have wide-
spread effects on persons who are not parties to the litigation. 
17
This Comment first outlines the O'Gilvie and Miller cases. The dis-
At the time this lawsuit was filed, one of the operating divisions of Cudahy was the
American Salt Company.
A * * ;kfter the lawsuit was filed, General Host [the parent company of Cudahy]
divested itself of Cudahy, but retained American Salt as a wholly-owned subsidiary.
Subsequently, General Host signed a letter of intent to sell American Salt to a third
party.
Id. at 981.
12. Id. at 980-81.
13. Id. at 1007.
14. Id. at 1008.
15. Id.
16. The O'Gilvie court stated that the basis for the conditions set forth in the agreement
was "probably without precedent." 609 F. Supp. at 818. Moreover, "Judge Kelly said his own
research indicated there was no authority determining that he could or could not bargain with
the Playtex jury's punitive award." Schechet, Judges Bargain with Damages, Nat'l L.J., Aug.
12, 1985, at 1, 23, col. 1. In Miller, although the court claimed equitable jurisdiction to fashion
a remedy which works substantial justice between the parties, it did not address the issue of the
propriety of bargaining with a punitive damage award as a means of achieving this end. 592 F.
Supp. at 1007.
17. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281 (1976).
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cussion next examines the legal background and existing law regarding
judicial review of punitive damages, comparing judicial control over rem-
edies in analogous contexts and analyzing the role of remittitur in the
punitive damages arena. Next, the Comment makes the case for reme-
dial activism, evaluating judicial bargaining with punitive damages as a
possible solution to regulatory and judicial failures. It then considers the
constitutional, practical and economic objections to judicial bargaining
with punitive damage awards, providing workable guidelines for the im-
plementation of this innovative form of remedial activism.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc. and Miller v. Cudahy Co.
In O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Ina," the plaintiffs were the
surviving husband and children of Betty O'Gilvie.19 Ms. O'Gilvie died in
April of 1983 at the age of twenty-one, an apparent victim of TSS.20 On
February 25, 1985, the jury found that O'Gilvie's use of Playtex's super-
deodorant tampon caused or contributed to her death from TSS.2 1 The
jury also found that, compared to other tampons, the defendant's prod-
uct posed an increased risk to users and that the instructions inside and
outside the Playtex box did not adequately or fairly warn O'Gilvie of the
risk of contracting TSS.22 On the basis of these findings, the jury
awarded a total of $1,525,000 in compensatory damages.23 The jury was
further asked to determine whether the failure of Playtex adequately to
warn consumers of the risk of TSS was in reckless disregard of the conse-
quences of its acts and whether the defendant knew or should have
known of the increased risks of TSS created by its super-deodorant
18. 609 F. Supp. 817; see supra note 1.
19. Id. at 819.
20. See Schechet, supra note 16, at 23, col. 2. Toxic shock syndrome (TSS) is an illness
caused when certain fibers (in this case, polyacrylate) found in some tampons "encourage the
growth of Staphylococcus aureus, a bacterium sometimes present in the vagina. The bacteria,
in turn, generate poisonous waste products, which are circulated by the blood." A Verdict on
Tampons, TIME, Mar. 29, 1982, at 73. "The initial signs include high fever, diarrhea, vomiting
and dizziness, followed by a sunburn-like rash with peeling of the skin, especially on the hands
and feet. There may also be a sharp drop in blood pressure and, in severe cases, fatal shock."
Toxic Tampons, TIME, Oct. 6, 1980, at 104. Hundreds of women have fallen victim to this
sometimes fatal disease. Lawyers Flush Out Toxic Shock Data, SCIENCE, Apr. 13, 1984, at 132.
21. O'Gilvie, 609 F. Supp. at 817.
22. Id. "The Court discussed the present state of the warning on defendant's product
which acknowledges an 'association' between the use of the tampon and toxic shock syndrome
(TSS). The jury found that this warning was inadequate and the Court concurs." Id. at 819.
23. Id. at 818. The award included $250,000 for the conscious pain and suffering of Betty
O'Gilvie, $25,000 for nonpecuniary loss to Kelly O'Gilvie (Betty O'Gilvie's husband) and chil-
dren, and $1,250,000 in pecuniary loss to Kelly O'Gilvie and children. Id.
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tampons. The jury responded affirmatively to both inquiries and
awarded the plaintiffs an additional $10,000,000 in punitive damages.24
On motion by the defendant, the trial court considered whether the
punitive damage award was so excessive as to shock the conscience of the
court, 25 but found for the plaintiffs on that issue.26 However, the court
interpreted the high punitive award as the jury's way of saying, "[take
that damnable product off the market!"2 7 Therefore, the court offered
the following bargain to the defendant: If Playtex would "acknowledge
the jury's findings as factually established and announce the removal of
the polyacrylate tampon from the marketplace, the Court in turn would
consider a substantial reduction, if not elimination, of the punitive dam-
ages award."' 28 Playtex was advised "that it has never been the Court's
intention to negotiate or otherwise dictate the course of [the] defendant's
decisions... [and that] whatever decisions were made by the defendant
company, were its alone to make."29 Although the court recognized that
its actions were "probably without precedent,"30 it justified them on the
basis that the remedy implemented "'that which ought to be.' "31
Playtex complied with the terms of the court's offer and the punitive
damages were accordingly reduced to $1,350,000.32 The court
concluded:
Of paramount importance, the Court finds that [the de-
fendant's] action is a significant postjudgment remedial and
mitigatory response to the jury's findings. Indeed, the jury's
24. Id.
25. Id. For examples of cases where judges have reduced punitive awards on this basis, see
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Kirtley, 307 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1962) (award of $650,000 in
punitive damages was so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court in view of compensa-
tory award and defendant's poor financial status); Boyle v. Bond, 187 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir.
1951) ("grossly excessive" verdict reduced because of great disparity between the proof and the
jury's award); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981)
(remittitur of $125 million punitive award to $3.5 million upheld).
26. O'Gilvie, 609 F. Supp. at 818. Although the court ruled that the jury's punitive dam-
age award of $10 million was not excessive, it indicated that Playtex could take remedial action
which would make the award unnecessary. Id. at 819.
27. Id. at 818.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 819.
30. Id. at 818; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
31. O'Gilvie, 609 F. Supp. at 818. The court explained:
When wrongdoing is acknowledged, where change is agreed to, indeed, where change
has occurred, the Court is usually impressed and persuaded principally as to what
further punishment, if any, is then in order. In the Court's view, such remedial
events are appropriate elements of mitigation which, in the Court's discretion, should
be noted and considered.
Id.
32. Id. at 818-20.
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intent has been substantially sufficed. In view of the defend-
ant's actions, the Court finds that the punitive damages award
is now, in part, excessive and unnecessary.... [Playtex] has
faced its situation, it has acted most responsibly, and it has ac-
ted decently. It can be no further deterred; it has been pun-
ished enough!3
The second case of judicial bargaining with punitive damages, Miller
v. Cudahy Co., 4 did not involve a jury. There, the court used its power
to award punitive damages as a tool to convince the defendant that it
would be cheaper to undertake remedial action than to pay a $10,000,000
punitive award.35 In Miller, the plaintiffs were landowners and lessees
who sought both damages36 and equitable relief37 from the American
Salt Company, whose plant produced salt brine pollution that was dam-
aging their cropland. 38 The court found that "[e]ven though American
Salt's management was fully cognizant of [the] properties of salt and the
havoc that would be wreaked by massive salt pollution of the aquifer,
they reached a conscious and reasoned business decision to maximize
profits ' 3 9 and forego making the necessary repairs. Therefore, the court
ordered that its punitive damage award be held in abeyance, pending a
"conscientious, good-faith, and realistic effort to address and remedy,
within a reasonable time, the pollution presently existing in the aqui-
fer."'  The court stated:
A district court sitting in equity has broad powers to devise and
fashion a remedy between the parties before it that works a sub-
stantial justice between them, settles the matters in controversy,
and prevents further litigation.
33. Id. at 819. In commenting on his actions, Judge Kelly said, "I'm convinced that what
I did is workable and perhaps the vehicle to give rise to a solution to this problem of massive
damages, and that is: Exchange them for remediation." Schechet, supra note 16, at 23, col. 2.
34. 592 F. Supp. 976; see supra note 8.
35. Id. at 1007-08.
36. See supra note 9.
37. See supra note 10.
38. Miller, 592 F. Supp. at 993.
39. Id. at 994. The court explained:
It was perfectly foreseeable to American Salt's management-and was, in fact, fore-
seen by them-that deterioration of the physical plant and equipment would occur,
and would result in pollution of the environment if not corrected by aggressive rou-
tine maintenance. The physical plant and equipment were, nevertheless, allowed to
deteriorate to the point where incidents of pollution were commonplace, everyday
occurrences.
Id.; see also infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
40. Miller, 592 F. Supp. at 1007.
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... In the further exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, this
Court concludes that substantial justice would best be worked
between these parties if the defendants could accomplish, at
their own expense, the removal of a substantial majority of the
salt from the aquifer.41
The court observed that the plaintiffs' interest in this litigation was not to
"get-rich-quick," but to enjoy the benefits of their farmland without the
pollution caused by the American Salt Company.42 Although a punitive
award might serve to deter and punish American Salt, the court's con-
cern was that such an award would do nothing to directly address the
violated rights of the plaintiff farmers.43 Additionally, the rights of other
downstream landowners, not involved in this law suit, could be affected.
The court noted that "increasing numbers of the state's citizens will be
injured"'  as the pollution spreads. The court concluded that if Ameri-
can Salt was truly the responsible corporate citizen that it proclaimed to
be, the company would implement a full scale cleanup program.41
American Salt has since begun the cleanup effort. The court will oversee
the program and evaluate its effectiveness before determining a final rul-
ing on the punitive damage award.46
B. Doctrinal Roots of Judicial Bargaining with Punitive Damages
The judges who decided O'Gilvie47 and Miller4 did not depart com-
pletely from accepted practice. Judicial bargaining with punitive dam-
ages has its roots in two well-known doctrines-remittitur of excessive
punitive damages and judicial management of equitable remedies.
41. Id. (citations omitted). In evaluating the potential success of the cleanup program, the
court commented:
There is a very high probability that remedial measures could prove effective in re-
moving a substantial amount of the pollution from the aquifer at a reasonable cost
well within the range of the defendants .... The court ... finds that the various
cleanup strategies have a substantial portential to benefit all of the parties to this
case, as well as the state.
Id. at 999.
42. "The plaintiffs... made it abundantly clear that, if they had the power to select any
remedy they wanted, they would choose to have the water under their properties restored and
once again fit for irrigation and domestic uses." Id. at 998.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 999.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1008.
47. 609 F. Supp. 817; see supra note I & notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
48. 592 F. Supp. 976; see supra note 8 & notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
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1. Punitive damages and remittitur
The successes, failures and goals of the punitive damage remedy are
a subject of continuing academic, legislative and judicial debate.4 9 Pres-
ently, scholars, legislators and judges are faced with determining issues
such as: under what circumstances should punitive damages be
awarded, 0 whether liability insurance should be allowed to cover the
cost of punitive damage awards51 and whether there is an adequate solu-
tion to the apparent excessiveness of jury verdicts. 2 Punitive damages
are recognized in the federal courts5 3 and most states. 4 Such damages
can be awarded in addition to compensatory damages when it is proven
49. See generally Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1 (1982); Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward A Principled Approach, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1980); Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its
Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117 (1984); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case For Reforming
Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983); Note, In Defense of Punitive Dam-
ages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 303 (1980); Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A
Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158 (1966).
50. See generally Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CI. L. REv. 1 (1982); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1258 (1976); Comment, The Relationship of Punitive Damages
and Compensatory Damages in Tort Actions, 75 DICK. L. REv. 585 (1971); Note, Allowance of
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REv. 613 (1972); Comment, Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895 (1976).
51. See generally King, Insurability of Punitive Damages: A New Solution to an Old Di-
lemma, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 345 (1980); Long, Insurance Protection Against Punitive
Damages, 32 TENN. L. REv. 573 (1965); Oshins, Should Punitive Damages be Within the Cov-
erage of Liability Insurance?, 5 FORUM 78 (1969); Note, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A
Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1976).
52. See generally James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts: New Trial
on Some or All Issues, Remittitur and Additur, 1 DUQ. L. REV. 143 (1963); Surrick, Punitive
Damages and Asbestos Litigation in Pennsylvania: Punishment or Annihilation?, 87 DICK. L.
REv. 265 (1983).
53. As one commentator explained:
Many federal statutes expressly provide or forbid punitive recoveries. Under
others, however, the availability of punitive damages falls within the "penumbra of
express statutory mandates." Courts are therefore sometimes faced with the neces-
sity of making quasi-legislative decisions about whether to allow punitive awards.
Express reliance on such usually ambiguous factors as the common law availability
of the remedy, legislative history, or statutory language has produced, in the words of
the Second Circuit, a "conflicting gaggle of general rules" about when punitive recov-
eries should be allowed.
Comment, Punitive Damages Under Federal Statutes: A Functional Analysis, 60 CALIF. L.
REV. 191 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
54. Examples of states which do not recognize punitive damages include: Louisiana, see
Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882, 886 (La. 1980) ("ET]here is no need to introduce punitive
damages into our state substantive law. Clearly an award of compensatory damages will serve
the same deterrent purpose as an award of punitive damages."), and Nebraska, see Prather v.
Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 11, 261 N.W.2d 766, 772 (1978) (the measure of recovery in all civil
cases in Nebraska is compensatory damages).
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that "the defendant acted out of malice, willfully, wantonly, recklessly,
. . . with conscious disregard or indifference toward the interests of
others" 55 or where there are aggravating circumstances of gross negli-
gence, fraud or oppression. 6 These damages are being awarded in an
increasing variety of cases, including "bad faith breach of contract
claims, violations of civil rights, fraudulent violations of state securities
laws, and products liability actions."
5s7
Traditionally, judges express their disapproval of excessive punitive
damage awards by offering the plaintiff the option of remitting a portion
of the award in exchange for a denial of the defendant's motion for a new
trial. 8 The court usually considers ordering a remittitur on motion by
the losing party, but may also act on its own initiative.5 9 If the prevailing
party refuses the remittitur offer, the court will order a new trial.60 How-
ever, the court's decision to grant the losing party's request for remittitur
is not a power which can be arbitrarily applied.6" The following is an
example of guidelines for a court's use of the remittitur doctrine:
The question is not whether the Court would have awarded a
smaller sum than was awarded by the jury. The question is not
whether the size of the verdict was merely too great. It is
55. Ellis, supra note 49, at 20 (footnotes omitted).
56. See id.; see also Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims,
supra note 50, at 614; see generally, D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 204-21 (1973).
57. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 49, at 640 (footnotes omitted).
58. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 480 (1935). "'When an excessive verdict is
given, it is usual for the judge to suggest to counsel to agree on a sum, to prevent the necessity
of a new trial.," Id. (quoting J. MAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 580 (9th
ed. 1920)).
59. See 6A J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
59.08[7], at 187 n.1 (2d ed. 1985).
60. See Neal v. Matanuska Valley Lines, 165 F. Supp. 785 (D. Alaska 1958) (court has
option of granting new trial if prevailing party does not agree to remittitur). The defendant
may appeal the denial of a request for remittitur or of a new trial. See Dagnello v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961) (review of exercise of discretion by trial judge in refus-
ing to set aside a verdict for excessiveness and resort to remittitur); Whiteman v. Pitrie, 220
F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1955) (review of whether there was abuse of discretion by the trial court in
denying motion for new trial on ground that verdict was excessive); Butcher v. Krause, 200
F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952) (review of whether trial court abused discretion in amount of dam-
ages awarded); Sebring Trucking Co. v. White, 187 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1951) (review of
whether there was abuse of discretion in overruling motion for new trial on ground that verdict
was excessive). However, the plaintiff may not appeal from a remittitur that has been ac-
cepted. See Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 650 (1977) (court ruled that plaintiff
could not accept remittitur "under protest," thereby reserving the right to appeal).
61. "Ordinarily, of course, the amount of damages is for the jury, and whether a verdict
should be set aside as excessive is a matter resting in the discretion of the trial judge. This,
however, is not an arbitrary but a sound discretion, to be exercised in the light of the record in
the case and within the limits prescribed by reason and experience." Virginian Ry. Co. v.
Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400, 407 (4th Cir. 1948).
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whether the verdict was brought about by passion and preju-
dice; whether it is so exorbitant as to shock the conscience of
the Court; and even whether it is so inordinately large as obvi-
ously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range
within which the jury may properly operate. 2
Remittitur, therefore, is not intended as a vehicle by which the court may
substitute its own view for that of the jury; instead, it may be applied
only under exceptional or unusual circumstances.63
With judicial bargaining, the punitive award will be upheld unless
the defendant implements the equitable alternative offered by the court.
Once the defendant takes the remedial action, the punitive award may
become, in part, unnecessary and excessive because the circumstances
which originally warranted the punitive award have changed. Remittitur
then becomes an appropriate option for the court. There are, however,
key differences between judicial bargaining with punitive damages and
remittitur. First, in neither O'Gilvie nor Miller did the court determine
that the original punitive awards were excessive, a requirement for a re-
mittitur order. In O'Gilvie, the court specifically ruled that the punitive
award was not excessive," but determined that remedial action would
lessen the necessity for imposing the punitive award.65 In Miller, because
the punitive award was issued by the judge, it can be assumed that he
believed his punitive award was reasonable.6 6 Second, in remittitur it is
the plaintiff who makes the decision whether to accept a lesser amount of
damages in order to avoid a new trial. However, in both O'Gilvie and
Miller, the fate of the punitive award was in the hands of the defendants,
based on a judge-initiated remedial alternative. If the defendant chose to
accept the offer made by the judge, the punitive award would be reduced
or eliminated. Therefore, under these two examples of judicial bargain-
ing, the plaintiff was not a party to the decision to alter the remedy im-
posed. Nor was the plaintiff given the option of rejecting the proposed
62. Graling v. Reilly, 214 F. Supp. 234, 235 (1963). The Graling court considered the
following factors in deciding that the jury had not been influenced by undue passion or
prejudice:
The case was tried by able counsel on a very high level, without any attempt at undue
eloquence or histrionics. All the witnesses, including the two plaintiffs, gave their
testimony in a calm, deliberate fashion, without any manifest attempt at dramatiza-
tion, exaggeration or painting the situation in lurid colors.
Id. at 237-38.
63. See id.; see also Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 29 (1889) (court not authorized to
overturn jury award based on its own estimate of amount of damages plaintiff should have
recovered).
64. O'Gilvie, 609 F. Supp. at 818.
65. Id.
66. Miller, 592 F. Supp. at 1007.
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remedial alternative in exchange for a new trial. These distinctions be-
tween judicial bargaining with punitive damages and remittitur may
serve as potential obstacles to acceptance of the practice.
2. Judicial management of equitable remedies
Although the use of bargaining with punitive damage awards as a
mechanism for implementing equitable remedial alternatives is an inno-
vative approach, judicial management of equitable remedies already ap-
pears in a variety of contexts. For example, in the areas of trusts and
bankruptcy, "[c]ourts have developed and administered, almost entirely
on their own, significant bodies of remedial law requiring them to engage
in continuing supervision of enterprises."67 Additionally, "[i]udges ac-
tively supervise the implementation of a wide range of remedies designed
to desegregate schools and to reform prisons and other institutions."68
This form of lawsuit has been labelled "public law litigation,"'69 and re-
fers primarily to civil rights actions. "The label was designed to empha-
size that in such cases, the federal courts [and state courts to a lesser
extent] are no longer called upon to resolve private disputes between pri-
vate individuals according to the principles of private law."70 Rather,
the trend in public law litigation is toward increased judicial activism.
The differences between traditional private litigation and public law liti-
gation are outlined as follows:
[1] Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a
form logically derived from the substantive liability and con-
fined in its impact to the immediate parties; instead, it is for-
ward looking, fashioned ad hoe on flexible and broadly
remedial lines, often having important consequences for many
persons including absentees. [2] The remedy is not imposed but
negotiated. [3] The decree does not terminate judicial involve-
ment in the affair: its administration requires the continuing
participation of the court .... [4] The subject matter of the
lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals about pri-
vate rights, but a grievance about the operation of public
policy.71
67. Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 489 (1980).
68. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 377 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
69. Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4,
4 (1982).
70. Id. (material in brackets added to preserve context of original) (footnote omitted).
71. Chayes, supra note 17, at 1302.
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The trend in public law litigation illustrates the contrast between the
traditional role of the courts as neutral arbiters of private disputes and
the practice of judicial management of equitable remedies. Under a sys-
tem of judicial bargaining, it is the judge who initiates the remedial alter-
native, not a party to the action. In O'Gilvie for example, the court
outlined a remedial alternative completely on its own initiative, without
any input from the plaintiff. Moreover, the defendant is given a choice of
remedies when offered a bargain by the court. The defendant may opt to
pay the punitive damages or take the equitable action suggested, whereas
standard equitable remedies (injunctions, for example) are mandates
from the court to which the defendant must adhere.7 2 In both O'Gilvie
and Miller, the court chose to give the defendants a choice of remedies,
rather than limiting the alternatives to the relief requested by the plain-
tiffs. Therefore, although judicial management of equitable remedies is
well established in other contexts, judicial bargaining with punitive dam-
ages is indeed outside the scope of traditional practice.
C. Doctrinal Justification for Remedial Activism
The underlying premise of O'Gilvie7 3 and Miller74 is that, under
some circumstances, the court should have the power to determine on its
own initiative when equitable remedies are superior to the remedies at
law. 75 However, judicial bargaining with punitive damages does not
neatly fit into the existing doctrines of remittitur or judicial management
of equitable remedies. Although there are similarities, there are impor-
tant differences which make judicial bargaining unique. Whereas the re-
mittitur doctrine is traditionally used merely to lower excessive damage
awards, judicial bargaining allows judges to independently fashion crea-
tive equitable solutions in response to the broader needs posed by the
72. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967). There, the Court stated:
"An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity
powers upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served upon persons made
parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must be obeyed by them however errone-
ous the action of the court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the
validity of a seeming but void law going to the merits of the case. It is for the court
of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its
decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court,
its orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them is con-
tempt of its lawful authority, to be punished."
Id. at 314 (quoting Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922)).
73. 609 F. Supp. 817; see supra note 1 & notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
74. 592 F. Supp. 976; see supra note 8 & notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
75. Currently, courts may grant equitable relief only if the remedy at law is inadequate.
See D. DOBBS supra note 56, at 57-62. Neither the O'Gilvie nor Miller courts addressed this
issue.
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litigation. And, although equitable remedies are imposed in many con-
texts, judicial bargaining with punitive damages as a means of imple-
menting such remedies is a new practice. The existing doctrines, as
expressed in the cases defining both remittitur and equitable remedies,
neither authorize nor prohibit the new practice. Therefore, given the
lack of controlling precedent, it is important to look to the underlying
policy considerations which motivated the O'Gilvie and Miller decisions
in order to determine whether there is a need and a justification for judi-
cial bargaining with punitive damages.
III. POLICY ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BARGAINING
WITH PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The Case For Remedial Activism
1. Failures of the present system
a. tort system failure
The message sent by the O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc. 76 and
Miller v. Cudahy C. 7 7 courts is that the current remedial options are
sometimes inadequate to meet the goals of the tort system. The frustra-
tions experienced by courts when attempting to work within the con-
straints of the tort system are best illustrated by Federal District Court
Judge Miles W. Lord's comments to officers of the A.H. Robins Com-
pany concerning the Dalkon Shield litigation:
The courts of this country are burdened with more than 3,000
Dalkon Shield cases. The sheer number of claims and the dila-
tory tactics used by your company's attorneys clog court calen-
dars and consume vast amounts of judicial and jury time....
If this court had the authority, I would order your com-
pany to make an effort to locate each and every woman who
still wears this device and recall your product. But this court
does not. I must therefore resort to moral persuasion and a
personal appeal to each of you .... You are the people with
the power to recall. You are the corporate conscience.
Please in the name of humanity, lift your eyes above the
bottom line. You, the men in charge, must surely have hearts
and souls and consciences.
Please, gentlemen, give consideration to tracing down the
76. 609 F. Supp. 817; see supra note 1 & notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
77. 592 F. Supp. 976; see supra note 8 & notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
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victims and sparing them the agony that will surely be theirs.78
This example graphically depicts the failure of the tort system to
achieve a major aim of products liability legislation-protecting consum-
ers from companies which market harmful products. The remedy at law
is damages, which is meant to compensate individual victims of defective
or unsafe products.7 9 The court's added ability to award punitive dam-
ages is meant to punish past actions and deter future wrongdoing.
However, these remedies do not always achieve the goal of protecting the
public. The O'Gilvie court recognized this shortcoming. When O'Gilvie
was decided, Playtex was still marketing its polyacrylate tampons8 1 and
there was no guarantee that a large punitive award in a single case would
result in a change in Playtex's product line. The court concluded that an
equitable remedy, removal of the product from the market, would better
meet the goal of protecting the public from harm.82 Thus, in offering the
choice of an alternative remedy to the defendant, the O'Gilvie court con-
sidered both the overall goal of products liability law, that of protecting
society at large, with the immediate goal of the litigation, that of com-
pensating the particular victim. The result of the court's action was that
the victim's family was compensated for its loss,8 3 and consumers were
protected from future harm by removal of the product from the mar-
ket.84 In this manner, the remedy formulated in O'Gilvie protected the
rights of the litigants and insured the safety of the general public.
The O'Gilvie example, however, illustrates another shortcoming of
the tort system. The removal of Playtex's polyacrylate tampon could not
have been achieved through traditionally available tort remedies. The
plaintiffs in O'Gilvie did not possess standing to ask for injunctive relief in
the form of the removal of the product from the market because such a
remedy would do nothing to redress the injury claimed.85 Because the
punitive damage remedy did not guarantee the removal of the product
from the market, and no alternative solution was presented by the pres-
78. HARPER'S June 1985, at 13, 14 (reprint of a speech delivered in the judge's Minneapo-
lis courtroom on Feb. 29, 1985) (emphasis added).
79. See generally Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, supra note 50.
80. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
81. 609 F. Supp. at 818.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
85. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (standing to invoke
injunctive relief to bar use of "chokehold" by police denied because likelihood of repetition of
injury was too speculative); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (litigant must be able to
prove a personal benefit from the court's intervention).
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ent or future litigation, the O'Gilvie court formulated its own remedy to
protect unsuspecting consumers from harm.
A similar situation was posed in Miller, where the court found it
necessary to balance the rights of individual litigants against the rights of
future and downstream landowners. The court was faced with the di-
lemma that the available legal remedies, although compensating the liti-
gants for their individual losses, did not adequately address the problem
of the existing pollution and the long-term problems it posed. First, an
injunction mandating that American Salt clean up past pollution was not
an available remedy to the plaintiffs in the litigation.86 Second, a puni-
tive award spread among several plaintiffs would do nothing to restore
the soil because it is unlikely that the landowners would pool the award
in order to initiate their own cleanup effort. The court recognized that
the "plaintiffs would.., be hard-pressed to directly address [their vio-
lated] rights were each plaintiff granted a fraction of a punitive award.
The pollution presently existing in the aquifer is a problem that can only
be effectively addressed in terms of the area as a whole, rather than as
individual tracts.""7 Therefore, the judge, acting as an arbiter, bargained
with the punitive damage award in order to induce the American Salt
Company to implement its own comprehensive cleanup effort under the
supervision of the court. 8
In both O'Gilvie and Miller, the courts were concerned with the in-
terests of persons who were not parties to the litigation. Their concern
was to maximize the societal benefit of the litigation. 9 Thus, the ration-
ale for judicial bargaining in these two cases was to provide for a greater
benefit to the public by bargaining with the defendant in order to induce
remedial action.
b. regulatory failure
A common response to the failure of the tort system has been to
86. 592 F. Supp. at 998. The court implied that the plaintiffs did not have the power to
elect a remedy which would facilitate implementation of a cleanup program. Id.; see also supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
87. 592 F. Supp. at 998.
88. Id. at 1008.
89. For example, the Miller court stated:
The Court also finds that important societal interests mingle in this controversy.
While the plaintiffs have suffered a direct injury, the state has also been injured by
the damage done to a valuable natural resource. The problem is also not limited just
to the plaintiffs in this lawsuit and the land they own or lease. Because the aquifer
flows, the salt dissolved in it will continue to move downstream unless steps are taken
to extract that salt. Thus, increasing numbers of the state's citizens will be injured as
the pollution continues to spread.
592 F. Supp. at 998-99.
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create administrative agencies with the authority to promulgate regula-
tions. These agencies have been criticized, however, on the ground that
they have been captured by the very industries they are supposed to regu-
late.90 The failure of such agencies to achieve their goals was an impor-
tant factor motivating judicial bargaining in O'Gilvie and Miller.
In fact, the O'Gilvie court was asked to resolve a dispute that
stemmed from the failure of regulatory checks on consumer products.
The Food and Drug Administration's (F.D.A.) handling of the TSS cases
graphically illustrates the inadequacies of regulatory solutions:
[The F.D.A.] fie contained numerous reports of cases of T.S.S.,
some of which were fatal, but the agency did not alert the pub-
lic until July 1980-after the [Center for Disease Control] had
verified more than 105 cases of the illness and at least ten
deaths. The F.D.A.'s response to the T.S.S. outbreak was typi-
cally restrained. In November 1980, it suggested a regulation
that would require tampon manufacturers to notify the agency
of any medical problems reported by users and to print a warn-
ing about toxic-shock syndrome on tampon packages. But the
proposed regulation drew fire from the industry .... And since
the number of reported T.S.S. cases seemed to be decreasing,
the F.D.A. postponed taking any action.91
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the O'Gilvie court
took the matter into its own hands. The court was individually able to
accomplish what the F.D.A. could or would not-removal of a danger-
ous product from the market. 92
Regulatory failure was also evident in Miller. American Salt simply
found that it was more profitable to allow the pollution to continue than
to remedy the problem. The maximum fine that could be imposed by the
Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE)93 for violating
the pollution laws was $10,000 per incident;94 the cost of complying with
90. See Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulation, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1971, at 39-
58.
91. Wanda, Tampons Can Be Harmful to Health, THE NATION, Jan. 2-9, 1982, at 17.
92. There is a possible constitutional separation of powers objection to judicial bargaining
with punitive damages which orders action that has been legislatively reserved to the domain
of a regulatory agency. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
93. The KDHE is the regulatory agency that was empowered to monitor emissions from
the American Salt plant. At one point, the agency had threatened to shut down the plant if an
emergency catch basin was not installed. Miller, 592 F. Supp. at 995. The KDHE also con-
ducted a public hearing concerning a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit
that was to be issued to American Salt. Id. at 996.
94. 592 F. Supp. at 995 (alluding to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-170d(a)(5) (1980)).
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the law was $60,000, plus two days' lost production.9 The court con-
cluded that American Salt "made a conscious and reasoned decision to
pollute the environment and take the occasional $10,000 fine as a cost of
doing business."9 6 Faced with the ineffectiveness of regulatory controls
on the defendant, the Miller court devised its own remedy via judicial
bargaining with punitive damages.
Unfortunately, the O'Gilvie and Miller cases are only two examples
of the overall failure of regulatory solutions.
Federal administrative agencies have been subjected to an in-
creasing barrage of criticism emanating from a variety of philo-
sophical and political positions. Economists are concerned
with inefficiency, waste and shortages they see caused by cer-
tain forms of regulation. Businessmen complain of unreasona-
ble administrative burdens and lack of coordination among
agencies. Consumer groups complain that regulation is ineffec-
tive. All this criticism centers around the charge that the agen-
cies have failed effectively to discharge their mission of
regulating given sectors of the economy to promote the public
interest.
97
One important reason for the failure of regulatory agencies may be that
their motivations differ significantly from those of an injured party seek-
ing redress. Injured plaintiffs may be more zealous than regulatory agen-
cies because the plaintiff has a stake in the outcome of the particular case.
Agencies, on the other hand, may be more concerned with bureaucratic
politics than zealous enforcement of the law. Therefore, if judicial bar-
gaining with punitive damages is to provide an alternative to administra-
tive solutions, care must be taken to ensure that the implementation of
such a system does not compromise or diminish the forces motivating
95. Id. at 996.
96. Id.
97. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 106
(1979). A substantial body of literature has criticized the effectiveness of various regulatory
agencies. For example, Ralph Nader's Center for the Study of Responsive Law has produced
a series of reports criticizing the performance of various regulatory agencies. See, e.g., R.
FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC
(1970) (the Ralph Nader Study Group report on the Interstate Commerce Commission and
Transportation); P. KENNEDY, FLYING DILEMMAS: CONSUMER PROBLEMS AND COM-
PLAINT MECHANISMS FOR AIRLINE PASSENGERS (1978); H. WELLFORD, SOWING THE
WIND: A REPORT FROM RALPH NADER'S CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW
ON FOOD SAFETY AND THE CHEMICAL HARVEST (1972). Criticism of administrative agencies
has also come from the opposite end of the political spectrum. See Posner, The Federal Trade
Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 82-89 (1969).
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potential plaintiffs.9 8
2. Judicial bargaining as a potentially efficient and effective form of
remedial activism
Judicial bargaining with punitive damages offers a choice to the de-
fendant: pay the punitive award or undertake remedial action. Thus, the
defendant, the person who is in the best position to weigh the costs and
the benefits of the proposed alternatives, is the decision maker. By con-
trast, in traditional equitable relief, it is the responsibility of the judge to
weigh the costs and benefits by balancing the equities against the hard-
ships.99 However, the judge may lack the same level of expertise and
information as the defendant to engage in the balancing process. Thus,
the judge's decision may be less likely to result in the most optimal solu-
tion. In contrast, in traditional cases where injunctive relief is ordered,
there is no alternative. The defendant must adhere to the court order no
matter how costly."c° Under judicial bargaining with punitive damages,
however, the defendant can weigh the alternatives and make the most
economically beneficial and efficient decision. Since it is the court which
fashions the equitable alternative, the goals of the court are presumably
met no matter which choice the defendant makes.
In formulating a bargain to offer to a defendant, the court has sub-
stantial flexibility to tailor a remedy best suited to the particular case.
Thus, the O'Gilvie court recognized that, although the available remedies
might serve to meet the needs of the individual plaintiffs, they did not go
far enough in addressing the rights of consumers. Without judicial bar-
98. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
99. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 52-54. Professor Dobbs explains:
The equities of a case are usually taken to refer to matters of fault, ethical posi-
tion, and delay. Thus if one party has been guilty of some misleading conduct, this
may be considered, even if it does not in itself amount to an estoppel. Hardships,
changed position and various forms of prejudice or harm to the parties are also con-
sidered in this balancing.
Since all or almost all equitable remedies are discretionary, the balancing of
equities and hardships is appropriate in almost any case as a guide to the chancellor's
discretion. Examples of cases in which balancing occurs are cases in which injunc-
tions are sought to compel removal of encroaching structures, or to force removal of
structures erected in violation of building restrictions, or to force removal of
nuisances.
Id. at 52-53 (footnotes omitted).
100. In theory, the defendant may be able to buy out of compliance with the injunction by
settling with the plaintiffs. If there are a large number of plaintiffs, however, transaction costs
and the possibility of holdouts may make it impossible to buy out of compliance with the
injunction. With judicial bargaining, a single agent, the judge, is substituted for the plaintiffs,
eliminating the possibility that transaction costs or holdouts will produce an inefficient result.
See also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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gaining with punitive damages, the court would have been unable to or-
der Playtex's polyacrylate tampon off the market, 10 1 or order Playtex to
educate the public about the dangers of TSS. °2 In Miller, because the
court did not possess the option of ordering a cleanup program through
traditional mechanisms,"' judicial bargaining with punitive damages
provided the only means by which the court could persuade the Ameri-
can Salt Company to implement a cleanup program. Judicial bargaining
with punitive damages, therefore, offers courts the flexibility to formulate
remedies which address important societal interests, as well as the needs
of individual litigants.
B. Objections to Judicial Bargaining with Punitive Damages
1. Seventh amendment and integrity of jury verdicts
There may be some resistance to approving judicial bargaining with
punitive damages, a practice which is based, in part, on the remittitur
doctrine. Although the remittitur doctrine is well established in the judi-
cial system, its constitutionality has been questioned on seventh amend-
ment grounds. However, this objection can be made only in limited
circumstances. First, the provisions of the seventh amendment apply
only to cases tried in the federal courts."° Second, the amendment ex-
pressly applies only to jury cases. 0 5 Therefore, the seventh amendment
objection would not apply to cases such as Miller v. Cudahy Co., 106 that
are tried by a judge.
The text of the seventh amendment does not provide an explicit an-
swer to the question of whether judicial bargaining is constitutional. The
amendment reads:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-ex-
amined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
101. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
102. The court concluded that "[a]s to the need for a public education program, the defend-
ant's counsel have outlined a meaningful program which, given time and exposure, should
serve to inform and alert the public and medical community about the toxic shock process."
O'Gilvie, 609 F. Supp. at 819.
103. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
104. See Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877). Judicial bargaining with punitive
damages is thus far a federal innovation. The objections which may be encountered with indi-
vidual state constitutions concerning judicial alteration of jury verdicts must be dealt with on a
state-by-state basis and are outside the scope of this Comment.
105. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
106. 592 F. Supp. 976; see supra note 8 & notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
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rules of the common law." 7
The language of the seventh amendment was interpreted in Dimick v.
Schiedt 10 8 to mean that any procedure which allows a judge to reexam-
ine facts determined by a jury is unconstitutional, unless the procedure
existed in English common law in 1791 when the Bill of Rights was in-
corporated into the Constitution. 10 9
In Dimick, the United States Supreme Court noted in dictum that
the remittitur doctrine arguably violates the seventh amendment by al-
lowing a court to reexamine facts tried by the jury, a practice not fully
supported by common law principles,'10 and expressed the view that "if
the question of remittitur were now before us for the first time, it would
be decided otherwise." ' However, the Court reasoned that since "the
[remittitur] doctrine has been accepted as the law for more than a hun-
dred years and uniformly applied in the federal courts. . . we may as-
sume that in a case involving a remittitur... the doctrine would not be
reconsidered or disturbed at this late day.""' 2 Today, the practice of re-
mittitur has become so universal "and has had the apparent approval of
so many Supreme Court cases, that it cannot be contended that its use is
unconstitutional without a judicial uprooting of precedent akin to that
effected by Erie-Tompkins."'113
The actions of the O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc. 114 court can
be constitutionally justified under the remittitur doctrine. When the
court first ruled on the punitive damage award, it found the amount not
to be excessive, given existing circumstances.' Playtex was still market-
ing a dangerous product and had not initiated any educational programs
to warn consumers about the association between TSS and its product.
However, the court gave the defendants the option of taking action that
107. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
108. 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (landmark case which held additur unconstitutional). Additur,
the practice whereby a judge may increase an insufficient jury verdict, will not be discussed
within the text of this Comment. "It is well-settled ... that the Seventh Amendment prohibits
the utilization of additur, at least where the amount of damages is in dispute." Hawkes v.
Ayers, 537 F.2d 836, 837 (5th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted) (verdict of $5000 for injuries
sustained in automobile accident was reasonable and consistent with the evidence).
109. 293 U.S. at 476.
110. Id. at 484.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 484-85.
113. 6A J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 59.08[7],
at 190-91 (2d ed. 1985) (referring to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding
that federal courts must apply state common law to substantive questions when jurisdiction is
founded upon diversity of citizenship)) (footnotes omitted).
114. 609 F. Supp. 817; see supra note 1 & notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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would change those circumstances,116 thus making remittitur appropri-
ate in the eyes of the court. Once Playtex took its polyacrylate tampon
off the market and implemented an educational program,' 1 7 the court
reasoned that the punitive damage award was, in part, excessive and un-
necessary. Had those conditions been in effect when the jury awarded
the punitive damages, the judge could have ordered a remittitur. There-
fore, proponents of judicial bargaining can argue that bargaining with
punitive damages is a permissible extension of the remittitur doctrine.118
2. Departing from the judicial role
The effectiveness and credibility of our judicial system depends on
the neutrality and impartiality of its judges." 9 If courts become respon-
sible for fashioning creative remedies by bargaining with punitive dam-
ages, judicial impartiality may be compromised. In essence, when
bargaining with punitive damages, the judge takes on the role of the
plaintiff in a settlement negotiation. If the defendant agrees to undertake
certain actions, as outlined by the judge, a compromise on other areas of
liability can be reached. In effect, the judge becomes an active party in
the dispute.
The judge also becomes the attorney for unrepresented parties to the
litigation. The bargain offered to the defendant is designed to benefit
those unrepresented interests. In O'Gilvie, the unrepresented interests
116. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 6 & 102 and accompanying text.
118. Conversely, it can be argued that the Supreme Court only approved the practice of
remittitur because it was a well-established modem historical practice. Given that there is no
precedent for judicial bargaining, the Court may not be willing to extend the remittitur doc-
trine to encompass such remedial activism. However, this would be a very mechanical inter-
pretation of the Dimick opinion. The real question is whether judicial bargaining with punitive
damages is materially different from the remittitur doctrine; that is, whether judicial bargain-
ing results in a greater infringement on the decision of the jury than does remittitur. But there
is no material difference between remittitur and judicial bargaining because the defendant's
jury trial right is affected in exactly the same way by both practices.
There is another potential problem with the constitutionality of the remittitur doctrine.
Dimick relied on the assumption that historical practice serves as a basis for constitutionality.
Dimick's view of the role of historical practice in constitutional interpretation was, however,
placed in question by two recent Supreme Court decisions. In Immigration and Naturalization
Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Court struck down the legislative veto as unconstitu-
tional. The Chadha Court rhade it clear that the existence of a long-standing historical prac-
tice does not necessarily establish constitutionality. Moreover, the Court's decision in Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), has been interpreted to stand for the proposition that "even
long-standing historical practice should receive little deference if it sheds no light on the inten-
tions of the Framers." United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1985) (en
bane) (Norris, J., dissenting). Therefore, the constitutional basis of the Dimick decision has
been called into question. See generally id.
119. See Resnik, supra note 68, at 428; Chayes, supra note 17, at 1286.
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were those of the consumer, whereas in Miller, the downstream landown-
ers were the beneficiaries of the court's activism. By taking an activist
role, the judge may lose objectivity and be unable fairly to decide
whether the punitive award ultimately should be reduced. In bargaining
with the punitive damage award, the judge effectively reformulates the
pleadings to reflect the remedy deemed most desirable. In the absence of
appropriate safeguards, such biases may prevent the judge from fairly
and impartially creating and supervising the implementation of the pro-
posed equitable alternative. Consequently, preserving the judge's role as
a neutral arbiter must be considered in formulating guidelines for the
implementation of judicial bargaining with punitive damages.
120
3. Reduced incentive to litigate
Given the inadequacies of the regulatory approach, 1 ' "individual
members of society must play a significant role in instituting actions to
impose sanctions for serious misconduct." 1 22 The prospect of receiving
punitive damages gives individual citizens the incentive to "play this
role" of private attorney general. However, in an attempt to formulate
the best remedy, judges who engage in judicial bargaining with punitive
damages may shut the door on some private actions by reducing the in-
centive to litigate. The O'Gilvie court, after comforting the plaintiffs for
their reduced recovery,123 acknowledged the impact of their actions on
the plaintiffs' attorneys:
[P]erhaps some solace is owing to plaintiffs' counsel. These
lawyers, doubtless, have proceeded here with an attorney fee
arrangement contingent upon the amount of recovery. This
procedure is entirely acceptable and understood. They have
surely advanced substantial expenses necessary for the success-
ful trial of this case. To reduce the recovery reduces their ex-
pectancy. Fortunately, trial of this case involves the kinds of
120. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
122. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 49, at 649.
123. The court stated:
Some comment is in order for the benefit of the plaintiff, Mr. Kelly O'Gilvie, for
himself and on behalf of his children. Following the jury's verdict, they enjoyed the
expectancy of a substantial recovery. Yet, they did not bring this action for personal
enrichment. They sought punitive damages solely to punish and deter the defendant
from future wrongdoing. In the face of defendant's announcements and representa-
tions, the plaintiffs have truly won!
O'Gilvie, 609 F. Supp. at 819.
But who have the plaintiffs won their victory for? It is clear that the plaintiffs' victory is
for the parties who are not actively represented in the litigation-the consuming public.
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lawyers with whom the Court can find comfort in open
discussions.
The Court is first to note that it is only through these at-
torneys' considerable efforts, their commitment of much time in
study and preparation, and their skills in the trial of this case,
that plaintiffs have prevailed. Not every lawyer would share
this experience. In the Court's view, however, they are also the
kinds of lawyers who quietly share a certain professional satis-
faction and sense of pride in seeing our adversary system work.
Their efforts here have literally changed an industryl In the
minds of good lawyers such as these, no amount of recompense
quite touches that accomplishment. To them, the Court sug-
gests that there will be other cases and other conquests. In-
deed, attorneys such as these are always welcome here. 124
Unfortunately, whether the welcome mat is out or not, the economics of
the situation may mean that if there is widespread judicial bargaining
with punitive damages, many cases will not be filed. "Absent the possi-
bility of obtaining punitive damages, it would be economically unfeasible
[in a case where actual damages are minimal] ... for a plaintiff to bring a
lawsuit and unlikely that the defendant would be deterred from similar
action in the future." '125
The loss of this valuable tool of private law enforcement may allow
many wrong-doers to escape punishment. Although the O'Gilvie court
believed that the attorneys should be satisfied with a noble outcome, the
practicality may be that large punitive awards are the key to making
their practice profitable or even possible. 126 The Miller court addressed
the issue by asserting that the plaintiffs were not looking for a "get-rich-
quick" scheme.127 However, the motives of the plaintiffs in this particu-
lar litigation may not be the same as other potential plaintiffs and their
attorneys. In setting guidelines for remedial activism, care must be taken
to assure that the needs of all parties are met by the alternative
proposed. 128
124. Id. at 819-20.
125. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 49, at 650.
126. For example, one winning case may finance a significant portion of a personal injury
attorney's practice. Lawyers, like other businesspersons, need capital to finance their opera-
tions. A large judgment in a single case may make it financially possible for the lawyer to
pursue other litigation.
127. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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4. Diminished deterrence
An important consideration is whether judicial bargaining with pu-
nitive damages will deter future wrongdoing as effectively as punitive
damages alone. In this context, two distinct types of deterrence can be
identified: specific deterrence, aimed at discouraging the defendant in the
litigation from repeating the offense,12 9 and general deterrence, aimed at
deterring others in the community from committing the same or similar
offense. 130
With regard to specific deterrence, in O'Gilvie and Miller there was
some speculation that the remedial measures would have been taken re-
gardless of the court's action. It was reported that American Salt "was
committed to a program of installing some monitor and cleanup wells
'regardless of the punitive damage award.' ""3 In addition, the circum-
stances surrounding the O'Gilvie case indicate that the polyacrylate tam-
pon would have been removed from the market shortly. 2 Thus, the
respective defendants may have gotten a better bargain than either judge
anticipated. On the other hand, by using judicial bargaining, both courts
have ensured that the remedial action will be taken in accordance with
specific mandates. In Miller, for example, the cleanup effort will be
monitored by the court,"' eliminating the possibility that the program
will be abandoned before it is completed. In O'Gilvie, in addition to re-
quiring the removal of the product from the market, educational pro-
grams have been implemented to warn consumers of the dangers of
TSS. I 4 Thus, the courts guaranteed the implementation of the proposed
remedial action.
Whether general deterrence will be achieved by the actions of the
O'Gilvie and Miller courts will depend upon the economic comparison of
the cost of prevention to the cost of the remedial alternative. If it is less
129. See H.L.A. HART, Intention and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 128 (1968).
130. See id. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text for a partial listing of the general
goals of deterrence.
131. Schechet, supra note 16, at 1, col. 2 (quoting Thomas D. Kitch, American Salt's
lawyer).
132. See id. at 24, col. 3.
The day before Judge Kelly's ... offer... Playtex received a copy of a Harvard
University medical study sponsored by Tambrands Inc. that linked ... polyacrylate
... to TSS. Tambrands subsequently took its Tampax tampon with polyacrylate off
the market, and Playtex made a similar move with some of its tampons, including its
Super Deodorant brand, which was at issue in the O'Gilvie case.
Id.
133. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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costly for the defendant to comply with the provisions of the bargain
than to pay the punitive damage award, general deterrence will be re-
duced. Unfortunately, there is a trade off between specific and general
deterrence under a system of judicial bargaining with punitive damages.
The bargain is only attractive to the defendant as long as it is less costly
than the sum of the current punitive award plus any future punitive dam-
ages that might be imposed in suits brought by other plaintiffs. However,
as the cost of the remedial alternative decreases, its effectiveness as a
general deterrent also decreases. If the cost of the remedial alternative is
too low in comparison to the punitive award, the goal of general deter-
rence may be thwarted. Therefore, the court must take care to balance
the dual role that punitive damage awards play in deterring future un-
wanted conduct.
135
IV. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL BARGAINING WITH
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The Goals of Punitive Damages and Remedial Law as the Basis for
Formulating Guidelines
The effort to develop specific guidelines for the implementation of
judicial bargaining with punitive damages need not proceed in a vacuum.
Considerable thought has already been given to the goals which shape
the imposition of punitive damage awards and equitable remedies. Ini-
tially, these goals are examined as a source for the development of spe-
cific guidelines for judicial bargaining.
The two primary goals of punitive damages may generally be de-
scribed as punishment and deterrence. 136 More specifically, punitive
damages serve the following purposes: 1) punishing the defendant for his
actions as a means for expressing community outrage and enforcing es-
tablished norms of conduct; 137 2) deterring the defendant from repeating
the offense so as to protect the community at large from a known
harm;138 3) deterring others in the community from committing the same
or similar offense;139 4) providing an incentive for plaintiffs who other-
135. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
136. O'Gilvie, 609 F. Supp. at 818; Ellis, supra note 49, at 11.
137. See Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 90 (1982);
Ellis, supra note 49, at 3; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 49, at 647; Comment, Punitive Dam-
ages Under Federal Statutes: A Functional Analysis, supra note 53, at 207.
138. See Ellis, supra note 49, at 3. See supra note 129 and accompanying text for a descrip-
tion of specific deterrence.
139. See Cooter, supra note 137, at 90; Ellis, supra note 49, at 3. See supra note 130 and
accompanying text for a description of general deterrence.
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wise would not sue;"4 and 5) fully compensating victims for uncompen-
sable losses and attorney's fees. 4 ' A major focus of these goals is a
concern that the interests of all parties to the litigation and those affected
by it are considered. Thus, in determining guidelines for judicial bar-
gaining with punitive damages, it is important that the rights of one
party are not inadvertently overshadowed by the benefits that judicial
bargaining will confer on another. If there is an overriding policy inter-
est in protecting the rights of one party to the detriment of another, that
interest must be clearly stated.
The five basic goals of remedial law include: 1) congruence between
the right violated and the remedy assessed; 2) administrative conven-
ience; 3) the formulation of substantive goals in light of remedies avail-
able; 4) consistency in application; and 5) the avoidance of economic
waste.' 2 These objectives require that the practice of judicial bargaining
with punitive damages be administered in an equitable manner which
provides notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard. Moreover,
the implementation of the alternative equitable remedies must not signifi-
cantly burden the court or pose undue hardships on defendants. Thus,
the goals of punitive damages and of remedial law provide the backdrop
for the formulation of guidelines for judicial bargaining with punitive
damages.
B. Guidelines for the Decision of Whether to Bargain
Judicial bargaining may not be appropriate in every case in which
punitive damages are awarded. Therefore, before considering the proper
procedure for the implementation of judicial bargaining, the court must
decide whether to bargain at all. The court should make the following
inquiries:
Consideration of alternative remedies-In determining whether judi-
cial bargaining is appropriate, the court must look beyond the instant
litigation. If a regulatory agency has assumed jurisdiction over the prob-
lem, it may be appropriate for the court to defer to the agency's greater
expertise. The court should also determine if the remedial action desired
could be imposed by another court in other pending litigation. In this
140. See Cooter, supra note 137, at 90; see also supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
141. See Cooter, supra note 137, at 90; Ellis, supra note 49, at 3; Comment, Punitive Dam-
ages Under Federal Statutes: A Functional Approach, supra note 53, at 203. In comparing
punitive damages to criminal law enforcement, it has been argued that the additional goals of
rehabilitation and neutralization of the offense should be incorporated into the aims of the
current damages system. See Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reap-
praisal of Punitive Damages, supra note 49, at 1162.
142. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 3-8.
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manner, the judge may avoid taking action that is outside the scope of
the plaintiff's requested relief. Moreover, since the full ramifications of
judicial bargaining are uncertain, deferring to a traditional forum may be
a wise cautionary measure. For example, in O'Gilvie v. International
Playtex, Inc.,143 the court may have been able to coordinate its efforts
with those of the F.D.A., while in Miller v. Cudahy Co.,1  the court may
have deferred to the Kansas Department of Health and Environment la '
to take independent action.
Consideration of deterrent effect-The court should bargain with the
defendant only if the cost of complying with an alternative equitable rem-
edy is high enough to maintain the specific and general deterrent impacts
of the potential punitive damage award. The court should investigate
whether the remedial alternative offered to the defendant is action that
might be taken anyway. Deterring the specific defendant from repeating
the offense, and deterring potential defendants from committing the same
or similar offense, are considerations which address the ultimate societal
value of the litigation. Therefore, the court must weigh the alternatives:
reducing the punitive award sufficiently to induce the specific remedial
action, but not so significantly as to destroy the general deterrent effect.
Both the O'Gilvie and Miller courts appear to have taken these considera-
tions into account. In O'Gilvie, the court reduced, but did not eliminate,
the punitive award.14 6 In Miller, the court has reserved the option of
awarding the punitive damages in full or in part if the cleanup effort is
unsatisfactory. 147
C. Guidelines for Implementing the Bargain
Once the decision has been made to bargain with the punitive dam-
age award, the court should consider the following guidelines in effecting
its implementation.
Procedural safeguards-Prompt notice should be given to the plain-
tiff and the defendant that the court is considering bargaining with the
punitive damage award. Procedural due process, at a minimum, requires
an adversary hearing where the parties have the opportunity to contest
the use of bargaining itself and object to the content of the specific equita-
ble alternative proposed. The judge should present the remedial alterna-
tive to both parties, giving them an opportunity to contest the judge's
143. 609 F. Supp. 817; see supra note I & notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
144. 592 F. Supp. 976; see supra note 8 & notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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action and to suggest alternatives.
148
The right to appeal the bargain at the time it is offered is another
essential procedural safeguard. Because the appellate court does not par-
ticipate in shaping the bargain, appellate review is especially important in
guarding against the possibility that the trial court may have lost its neu-
trality in the process of bargaining with the punitive damage award.
149
In cases in which compliance with the bargain requires time consuming
action, such as the cleanup in Miller, postponement of the appeal could
deprive the plaintiff of the punitive damages for months or years. More-
over, when the cleanup is completed, and a reduced punitive damage
award is finally entered, the parties' positions may be unalterably
prejudiced. If the appellate court overturns the bargain after the defend-
ant has already performed the equitable remedy, the defendant may be
stuck with the equivalent of double punitive damages. If the appellate
court allows the bargain to stand in order to avoid this inequity, the
plaintiffs may be deprived of a punitive damage award which they should
have received. In either case, appellate review after the bargain has been
fully performed and a final judgment entered is not a satisfactory safe-
guard. Consequently, the decision of the appellate court in Miller to dis-
miss the appeal on the ground that the judgment was not final is
distressing.' 50
For these reasons, the final judgment rule-the rule that allows ap-
peal "only after all the issues involved in a particular lawsuit have been
finally determined by the trial court"15' should be modified to allow im-
mediate appeal from the entry of an order establishing a punitive dam-
ages bargain. Such an exception would be grounded in two existing
doctrines. First, appeal is already allowed from orders that are not final
but create "some immediate harm that might occur to the appellant if
review is postponed."' 152 The exception is limited by the requirement that
the harm be "irremediable should later review suggest that it was im-
properly ordered."' 53 Because compliance with a punitive damages bar-
gain unalterably changes the equities of the case for appellate review, the
148. Another alternative would be for the judge to alert the parties that bargaining was
being considered and call for arguments and proposals from both sides. This alternative would
have the advantage of protecting the judge's neutral role as an adjudicator, and now arbitrator,
of disputes. However, the interests of the parties to the litigation may be different from those
of the absent class of persons the bargain is meant to benefit. Therefore, a judicially initiated
remedial alternative may better serve the needs of all parties.
149. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 8.
151. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 579 (1985).
152. Id. at 589-90.
153. Id. at 590.
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rationale underlying the immediate harm exception to the final judgment
rule also supports an exception for such bargains. Second, appeals from
orders entering injunctions are specifically allowed by statute.154 Not
only are judicial bargains with punitive damages structurally similar to
injunctions, but the rationale underlying this exception-that an order
entering an injunction cannot be effectively appealed once the injunction
has been complied with-applies with equal force in the context of an
order establishing a punitive damages bargain. The decision to dismiss
the appeal in Miller was in error; great mischief may result if this ap-
proach is followed by other courts.
Maintaining judicial impartiality-The bargain should be structured
so that the judge does not have to enter into negotiations with the defend-
ant. The judge should not be put in the position of engaging in intensive
adversarial bargaining in trying to get the "best deal." A proposal which
required such negotiations could lock the judge into a partisan role
preventing fair and even-handed supervision of compliance with the
terms of the bargain."' 5 The court may also consider appointing a special
master to act as negotiator-arbiter. The special master could, for exam-
ple, work out the details of a bargain with the parties, leaving the ap-
proval and oversight functions to the district judge.
Ease of administration-In the interest of ease in administration, the
terms of the bargain should be structured so that there are objective crite-
ria for compliance. 56 In O'Gilvie, for example, the court had no diffi-
culty determining whether the product had been removed from the
market or if the educational program had been implemented. 157 Con-
versely, the Miller court has undertaken the responsibility of evaluating
the effectiveness of a technical and complicated cleanup program. 58
Preservation of the role of punitive damages in rewarding private at-
torney general actions-The court must consider how large a role puni-
tive damages played in providing an incentive for the litigation.' 9 If the
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1983).
155. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
156. Professors Thompson and Sebert explain:
It is a waste of judicial resources and of the time and money of the parties and
witnesses if the litigation culminates in a decree for specific relief that cannot be
enforced. The court which issues the decree exposes its limitations in a manner
which erodes its stature. Even where the decree can be enforced the expenditure of
resources necessary for enforcement may be all out of proportion to the gain to the
successful party from enforcement.
R. THOMPSON & J. SEBERT, REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND RESTITUTION 3-40 (1983).
157. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
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litigation was a high risk proposition, requiring the establishment of a
new legal theory or requiring difficult fact-finding efforts, the court may
want to preserve the punitive damage award as an incentive for potential
plaintiffs to take such risks. The court should also consider the relative
size of the compensatory and punitive awards. If it is the kind of case
where the punitive award represents a high percentage of the judgment,
bargaining may not be appropriate. In providing incentives to lawyers,
the judge should consider awarding fees based on the benefits that their
efforts have created. For example, in O'Gilvie, the fee award could re-
flect the value to future consumers of the removal of the product from
the market, whereas in Miller, the fee award could reflect the value to the
landowners of the cleanup program.'1
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to predict whether judicial bargaining with punitive
damages will gain widespread approval. However, the O'Gilvie v. Inter-
national Playtex, Inc. 161 and Miller v. Cudahy Co. 162 cases have brought
the failures and shortcomings of current practices to the attention of the
legal community and offered a potential solution. This Comment recog-
nizes that while there are cases where judicial bargaining would be the
best alternative, there are cases where judicial bargaining would be an
unwise practice. 163 Ultimately, the lesson is that the judicial system
should maintain the flexibility to implement alternative remedies when it
would best serve the interests of justice.
Rosemary A. Jackovic
160. There will undoubtedly be problems in estimating the value of the remedial alternative
and translating it into adequate compensation for the attorneys. The major emphasis of this
guideline, however, is to ensure that the needs of all parties are adequately addressed.
161. 609 F. Supp. 817; see supra note 1 & notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
162. 592 F. Supp. 976; see supra note 8 & notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
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